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Protecting Traditional Privacy Rights in a
Brave New Digital World: The Threat
Posed by Cellular Phone-Cameras and What
States Should Do To Stop It
Timothy J. Horstmann*
I. Introduction
Voyeurs have a new weapon in their assault on individuals' privacy.
Armed with tiny cellular phones that now come equipped with
increasingly powerful cameras, these technological Peeping Toms have
left their hiding places in the shadows and entered the community,
snapping inappropriate pictures of men and women in public places once
assumed to be safe.
The story is a common one: armed with a cellular phone that comes
equipped with a digital camera and internet access, an individual goes to
a shopping mall or other public place and scouts for a victim. Upon
settling on an attractive, skirt-clad young woman, he walks up behind
her, kneels down to presumably tie his shoelace, and quickly takes a
photo up the victim's skirt, without her even knowing about it. Within
seconds, the photo has been uploaded to a pornographic website
specializing in what has come to be known as "upskirting."1
Only twenty-three states have laws that explicitly address this
problem.2  Twenty-six others have generic "anti-voyeurism" or
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2007, The Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University.
1. "Upskirting" generally refers to the practice of taking unwanted pictures up a
woman's skirt or dress. Other common slang terms used alongside "upskirting" include
"downblousing," where an individual attempts to capture an image down a woman's
blouse, usually by standing some distance above her. In the interest of simplification,
this Comment uses a broader definition of the term "upskirting" to mean any unwanted
invasive picture-taking or viewing of a person's private areas, unless otherwise stated
within the text.
2. Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3019 (Supp. 2006)); California (CAL.
PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (West Supp. 2006)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335
(Supp. 2006)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 810.145 (Supp. 2006)); Hawaii (HAw. REv. STAT.
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"peeping" laws, which vary from state to state and may or may not be
applicable. 3  One state-New Mexico-has no law addressing the
practice. As of this writing, two state legislatures-New Jersey and New
York-have proposed legislation to substantially change their existing
laws on the practice.4
A few of the states with anti-voyeurism statutes, which resemble the
federal Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004,5 have tried to apply
those laws to the upskirt phenomenon, with decidedly mixed results.6
§ 711-1111 (Supp. 2005)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (2004)); Illinois (720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/26-4 (Supp. 2006)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.100 (West
2003)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:283 (2004)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 511 (2006)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-902 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2006)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 609.746 (Supp. 2006)); Missouri (Mo. REV.
STAT. § 565.253 (Supp. 2006)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:9 (Supp.
2006)); New York (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (McKinney Supp. 2006)); North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202 (2005)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08 (West
2006)); Pennsylvania (2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005));
Texas (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.15 (Vernon Supp. 2006)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 2605 (Supp. 2006)); Virginia (VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (Supp. 2006));
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115 (Supp. 2006)); and Wyoming (WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-4-304 (2005)).
3. Alabama (ALA. CODE. § 13A-11-32 (2005)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.123
(2004)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-16-101 (2006)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-7-801 (2006)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189a (Supp. 2006)); Georgia
(GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-61 (2003)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 35-45-4-5 (Supp. 2006));
Iowa (IOWA CODE § 709.21 (Supp. 2006)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001 (Supp.
2004)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 104 (2004)); Michigan (MIcH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.539j (Supp. 2006)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-63
(2006)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-223 (2005)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-311.08 (Supp. 2004)); Nevada (NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.603 (2005)); New Jersey
(N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West 2005)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-
12.2 (Supp. 2005)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1171 (2002)); Oregon (OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.700 (2005)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-64-2 (Supp. 2006)); South
Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470 (2003)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-21-4 (2006)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-605 (2003)); Utah (UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-9-702.7 (Supp. 2006)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 61-8-28 (2005)); and
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 942.08 (2005)).
4. See S. 2016, 212 Leg., 1st Annual Sess. (N.J. 2006); see also Assemb. 4101,
2005 Leg., 228 Sess. (N.Y. 2005). Strangely, the New York amendment would add a
new section on solely cellular phone-cameras to the statute, in addition to the previously-
enacted section that covers all such acts. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (McKinney
Supp. 2006).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000). The act makes it a crime to photograph the private
areas of an individual on federal land without his or her consent, "under circumstances in
which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id.
6. Some states, recognizing the futility of the effort, have simply chosen not to
prosecute the offenders. See, e.g., David Kremenetsky, Insatiable "Up-Skirt" Voyeurs
Force California Lawmakers to Expand Privacy Protection in Public Places, 31
MCGEORGE L. REV. 285, 286 (2000) (California legislature forced to amend criminal
code after series of incidents of video voyeurs being caught, questioned, then released);
David Abrams & Elizabeth Leis, Bill To Target Invasion of Privacy With Cell Phones,
THE MARYLAND GAZETTE, November 12, 2005, at A2 (recounting incident in Maryland
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled in State v. Morris7 that the
existing anti-voyeurism statute applied to the behavior.8 Yet in a case on
similar facts, the Washington Supreme Court ruled in State v. Glas9 that
the state's anti-voyeurism statute as it was then written did not apply to
the practice.'0  The Virginia Court of Appeals, in an unreported
decision," also held that its anti-voyeurism statute did not apply.
2
In Pennsylvania, the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland
County followed Washington's and Virginia's lead, resulting in a
disturbing loophole in the law. In the recent case of Commonwealth v.
Sullivan,13 the defendant, Robert Sullivan, was acquitted of invasion of
privacy 14 after he was caught taking a picture up a woman's skirt at the
Capital City Mall near Harrisburg.' 5 The Pennsylvania Assembly was
forced to pass an amendment to the Invasion of Privacy statute, which
now explicitly makes it a crime to photograph an individual's private
areas in a public place. 16
The Sullivan case illustrates the inadequacy of the current statutory
scheme in addressing this problem. With the practice outright legal in
three states and potentially legal in twenty-eight more, society cannot
wait around for the courts to decide whether the old anti-voyeurism
statutes are applicable, especially when it appears that many court
decisions will result in the same kind of loopholes that resulted from the
decisions of Sullivan, Glas, and C'Debaca. States need to amend their
existing laws or pass new laws to combat this growing problem, but must
do so in a careful manner. States must protect the victims of these
crimes while providing clear and concise language for the government to
prosecute offenders to the fullest extent of the law.
in which police, operating under older law, declined to pursue suspect after victim of
upskirting reported it); see also Jennifer Christman, What's In A Dame: One Slip of a Slip
Can Go Worldwide, THE ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, December 6, 2005, at Style
(recounting the Maryland incident, and opining that Arkansas law likely does not cover
upskirting either).
7. 644 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
8. Id. at 118.
9. 54 P.3d 147 (Wash. 2002).
10. Id. at 152.
11. C'Debaca v. State, No. 2754-97-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 72 (Va. Ct. App. Feb.
2, 1999).
12. Id. at*8.
13. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, No. CP-21-CR-2382-2004, slip op. (Pa. Com. P.
Aug. 17, 2005).
14. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7507.1 (2000) (amended 2005).
15. Sullivan, slip op. at *7.
16. 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005). The amendment
substantially rewrote the previous Invasion of Privacy statute, see 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 7507.1 (2000) (amended 2005); see also infra notes 71-73, 93-115 and the
accompanying text.
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This Comment will examine the problem of upskirting in light of
the current state statutory regime, as reflected in the Cumberland County
Court of Common Pleas' decision in Commonwealth v. Sullivan as well
as three other state court decisions addressing it. Part II examines the
current statutory regime seen in the anti-voyeurism laws, and how these
laws inadequately address the problem of upskirting. Part III examines
the court's decision in Sullivan, compared with the Glas, Morris, and
C'Debaca decisions. Part IV examines the recent amendment to the anti-
voyeurism law passed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly in
comparison with the other state statutes that have been passed to combat
this problem. Part V criticizes Pennsylvania's amendment and offers a
model statute that would more fully address the problem of upskirting.
II. The Anti-Voyeurism Statutes
The twenty-six states that have anti-voyeurism statutes can be
roughly grouped into three categories: the "Peeping Tom" statutes; 17 the
"Circumstances" statutes; 18 and the "Place" statutes. 19
The "Peeping Tom" statutes are generally targeted toward the
individual who trespasses onto private property, or waits nearby private
property. The Montana statute is typical:
A person commits the offense of surreptitious visual observation...
in a place of residence if a person purposely or knowingly hides,
waits, or otherwise loiters in the vicinity of a private dwelling house,
apartment, or other place of residence for the purpose of: watching,
gazing at, or looking upon any occupant in the residence in a
surreptitious manner, or; by means of an electronic or mechanical
recording device, surreptitiously recording the visual image of any
occupant in the residence.
20
As seen in the Montana law, the "Peeping Tom" statutes do not
explicitly address the viewing of individuals' private areas. Rather, they
are focused on the general intrusion of one's privacy that occurs with
unauthorized spying or surveillance.
The "Peeping Tom" statutes are extremely limited in scope and
would be of no use in prosecuting an individual engaged in upskirting.
17. This group consists of Alabama, Georgia, Montana, and Nevada; see supra
statutes cited at note 3.
18. This group consists of Colorado, Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, and Utah; see supra statutes cited at note 3.
19. This group consists of Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin; see supra statutes cited at note 3.
20. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-223 (2005) (emphasis added).
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PROTECTING TRADITIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS
Except for the Montana statute, these laws protect only private dwelling
places and the area immediately surrounding it.21 This restriction is
spelled out explicitly in the Alabama statute, which excludes from the
statute any place to which the public, or a large portion of the public, has
access.22 While the Montana and Nevada statutes are relatively new,23
the Alabama and Georgia provisions were passed at least twenty-five
years ago, before easily concealed cellular phone cameras exacerbated
the practice of upskirting.24
The second category, the "Circumstances" statutes, prohibits
upskirting under circumstances in which the victim would have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Utah statute is typical of this
approach:
A person is guilty of voyeurism who intentionally uses... equipment
that is concealed or disguised to secretly . . . film, photograph, record,
or view by electronic means an individual for the purpose of viewing
any portion of the individual's body regarding which the individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether or not that portion
of the body is covered with clothing; without the knowledge or
consent of the individual; and under circumstances in which the
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
25
The Utah statute and others like it omit any reference to a private
place, instead requiring that the act occur under circumstances in which
the victim would not expect his or her privacy to be violated.26  The
statutes attempt to shift the focus of whether the victim has a reasonable
expectation of privacy away from the location of the incident to the
circumstances in which in the incident occurred.
The problem with this approach is that the statutes provide no
guidance on just what these circumstances should be. 2' A court faced
with such a problem would probably interpret the statute by applying it
on a case-by-case basis. Such a case-by-case approach could yield
unsatisfactory results for two reasons. First, the approach would create
enforcement problems for police and prosecutors; prosecutors would
21. Id. The Montana statute is unique in that it contains specific provisions
applicable to individuals engaged in businesses that would present opportunities for such
misbehavior, such as clothing stores, hotels, and apartment complexes. Id.
22. ALA. CODE. § 13A-1 1-32 (2005).
23. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-223 (2005) (passed in 1997); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.603 (2005) (passed in 2005).
24. See ALA. CODE. § 13A- 11-32 (2005) (passed in 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
61 (2003) (last amended in 1968).
25. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-702.7 (Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. See id. (Utah statute leaving the phrase "circumstances in which the individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy" undefined).
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either arbitrarily apply the law, or simply not prosecute offenders in all
but the clearest of cases. 28 Second, the case-by-case approach would
invite defense attorneys and the courts to inquire into the victim's
circumstances, further invading his or her privacy and making it unlikely
that victims would want to come forward and risk further
embarrassment. Without explicit instructions as to what constitutes
"circumstances in which an individual has an expectation of privacy,"
these laws could prove unreliable, as a court could easily limit the reach
of a statute by concluding that upskirting in a public place does not
constitute circumstances affording an expectation of privacy.29
The final and largest category, the "Place" statutes, requires that the
victim be in a place where he or she has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. These statutes were commonly passed to protect the users of
public restrooms, tanning salons, and changing rooms; areas that are
technically in places accessible to the public, yet afford an expectation of
privacy when in use.3 °
Pennsylvania's "Place" statute that was in effect during the Sullivan
case was typical of this group. It criminalized the viewing,
photographing, or filming of an individual in full or partial nudity
without that person's knowledge and consent. 3' The statute employed
the most common limitation seen in the group: it only applied to those
instances when the victim was in a place where he or she would have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy," defined by the statute as "a location
where a reasonable person would believe that he could disrobe in privacy
without being concerned that his undressing was being viewed,
photographed or filmed by another., 32  The Pennsylvania statute,
however, did not contain the other limitation seen in some of the state
statutes: a requirement that the perpetrator act with a specific intent,
most often to satisfy his or her own sexual gratification or the sexual
28. The statutes would also present an opportunity for defendants to challenge their
constitutionality based upon vagueness. Such an argument was advanced in State v.
Glas, 54 P.3d 147, 154 (Wash. 2002), albeit unsuccessfully. However, key to the court's
rejection of the vagueness argument was the fact that the statute was limited to private
places, giving defendants fair notice of what behavior would be prohibited. Id.
29. Such a conclusion would hardly be surprising, as the majority of the upskirt
cases that determined whether a victim had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" did so
by distinguishing between places of general public access and places where the victim
had the right to exclude others from his or her immediate vicinity. See infra notes 65-70
and the accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-45-4-5 (Supp. 2006) (such places include "restrooms,
baths, showers, and dressing rooms").
31. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7507.1 (2000) (amended 2005).
32. Id. Other states were more explicit, even providing examples; the most common
being "restrooms, baths, showers, and dressing rooms." IND. CODE § 35-45-4-5 (Supp.
2006).
[Vol. 111:3
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gratification of another.33 By their language then, the "Place" statutes
only reach the traditional Peeping Tom that hides in dressing rooms,
bathrooms, changing rooms, and other intimate areas where an individual
would feel safe to disrobe.34
At a time when cellular phones are increasingly coming equipped
with powerful digital cameras, 35 Peeping Toms no longer need to hide in
dressing rooms, as demonstrated by recent and future sales figures.36
These figures show that a perfect storm of easy-to-acquire technology in
a small, portable format is developing.37  A recent study found that
despite being available for only a few years, thirty-six percent of cellular
phones sold in 2004 had the ability to take pictures.38 The study
predicted that the amount was expected to rise to fifty-five percent by the
end of 2005, and eighty-seven percent by 2009. 39
Despite the recent appearance of cellular phone-cameras, the states
have been on notice about the problem for some time. As early as 1998,
California newspapers had reported incidents of upskirting,4° resulting in
the passage of the current California privacy law.41 Despite the horrific
nature of the incidents,42 prosecutors, operating under an older California
privacy law from 1996,43 were unable to pursue the individuals.44 The
33. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189a (Supp. 2006) (Providing that a "person
is guilty of voyeurism when, with malice ... or with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual
desire of such person or any other person") (emphasis added).
34. C.f IND. CODE § 35-45-4-5 (Supp. 2006), OR. REv. STAT. § 163.700 (2005),
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12.2 (Supp. 2005), MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-63 (2006)
(statutes specifically defining the "place" to be a location where a reasonable person
would feel safe to disrobe).
35. See, e.g., Birgitta Forsberg, Restrictions Placed on Camera Phones: More
Places Say They May Violate Privacy, Security, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May
23, 2005, at E2 (stating that while U.S. cellular phone-cameras currently offer resolutions
of one megapixel or less, in South Korea cellular phones come equipped with cameras
touting resolutions of up to five megapixels).
36. Id.
37. See id. (describing the cellular phone market in the U.S. as "soaring").
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Bill Rams, Cyber-Peeping: It's Growing, It's Frustrating, And It's
Legal; TREND: Officials Say There's Nothing They Can Do To Stop Men From Filming
Up Skirts In Public Places, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, June 26, 1998, at Al (stating
that police were powerless to arrest individuals engaged in upskirting).
41. See Kremenetsky, supra note 6 at 289-90. The new California law is a
"Circumstances" statute, requiring that the behavior occur under circumstances in which
the victim would have an expectation of privacy. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2)
(West Supp. 2006).
42. See Kremenetsky, supra note 6 at 286 (stating that in one incident a man stalked
several women for eleven hours at the Disneyland theme park in an attempt to get
pictures of their undergarments).
43. Kremenetsky, supra note 6 at 289-90. Kremenetsky states that the California
legislature amended the criminal code in 1996, adding a "Peeping Tom" section to close
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frustration and outrage of seeing such individuals escape liability would
be replayed in Pennsylvania several years later.
III. Commonwealth v. Sullivan: A Loophole is Born
On August 23, 2004, a young woman was at the food court of the
Capital City Mall near Harrisburg.45 As she was talking to a friend, a
man snuck up behind her, crouched down, and quickly took a picture up
her skirt.46 After the victim was informed of what had happened, she
chased the man through the mall and into the parking lot while calling
the police on her cell phone.47  The man, later identified as Robert
48Sullivan, was eventually caught and arrested for invasion of privacy.
At trial the key issue was whether the victim was in a place where
she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 49  Two competing
interpretations of this phrase were advanced.
Under the first interpretation, the "conceptual" view, whether an
individual has an expectation of privacy depends upon that person's
actual physical location.50 In most instances, this location is limited to
the home, although the United States Supreme Court has signaled that in
certain instances, an individual may have an expectation of privacy in
other places, when the person has taken steps to show he or she expects
privacy. 51 The "conceptual" view was implicitly adopted by courts in
Washington52 and Virginia.53
Under the second interpretation, the "spatial" view, an expectation
a separate loophole. That amendment, however, did not extend into the public sphere,
and consequently the problem of "upskirters" remained. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(1)
(West Supp. 2006). The amendment tracks closely with the language of the "Place"
statutes, discussed supra at notes 28-32 and the accompanying text.
44. See Kremenetsky, supra note 6 at 286 (noting that three separate individuals
were caught "in the act," but were released and faced no criminal charges for their
actions).
45. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, No. CP-21-CR-2382-2004, slip op. at *1 (Pa. Com.
P1. Aug. 17, 2005).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7507.1 (2000) (amended 2005).
49. Sullivan, slip op. at * 1.
50. Id. at *4.
51. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (finding that an
individual in a phone booth had a reasonable expectation of privacy).
52. State v. Glas, 54 P.3d 147, 150 (Wash. 2002). The Glas Court noted that
because the statute required that the victim be in a place where he or she had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, it simply did not make sense to disregard the conceptual
understanding of the term, as the statute clearly spoke in terms of where the person was
located, and not areas on the person's body. Id.
53. C'Debaca v. State, No. 2754-97-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 72, *6-7 (Va. Ct. App.
Feb. 2, 1999).
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of privacy is placed on zones of a person's body, such as their private
areas.54 Under this view, where that person is physically located is of no
matter to the inquiry. Whether there is an expectation of privacy
depends solely on the steps the victim has taken to protect his or her
privacy.55 This "spatial" view was adopted by a Minnesota court in State
v. Morris.
56
Reading the statutory definition for "reasonable expectation of
privacy," the court was constrained to reject the "spatial" approach and
acquit Sullivan of the charge.57 The definition stated that a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in those places "where a reasonable
person would believe that he could disrobe in privacy without being
concerned that his undressing was being viewed, photographed or filmed
by another., 58 As the food court of the Capital City Mall was simply not
a place where a person would feel safe to disrobe, Sullivan was not guilty
of the crime, although, in the court's words, "invasion of privacy sounds
like what [the] defendant did.,
59
Commonwealth v. Sullivan showed the inadequacy of the current
legislation, exposing a frightening loophole that was not closed until
Governor Rendell signed the new legislation into law in November
2005.60 Until the Pennsylvania Assembly acted, anyone leaving home
was a potential victim.
Although Pennsylvania has since closed the loophole, the result in
Sullivan could easily be repeated in any of the other "Place" statutes that
strictly limit the scope of applicability to certain locations. 61  The
54. See Sullivan, slip op. at *2. The Cumberland County district attorney argued this
approach, stating that the victim did not expect anyone to take a picture of her private
areas, since she had covered them with a skirt. Id.
55. Although it is arguable whether an individual has taken steps to enforce the right
of privacy, the threshold the victim would have to pass would likely be set very low; a
victim would likely be able to show an expectation of privacy simply by wearing clothes.
Cf Minnesota v. Morris, 644 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that
the area underneath a skirt is by definition a location where a person would have a
reasonable expectation of privacy).
56. 644 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). The Morris court quoted with
approval the words of the district court: "The area under a skirt... is a place or location.
It is spatial, not conceptual. By reason of the act of wearing of a covering, the person has
defined a spatial location, associated with his or her intimate parts, as a zone of privacy."
Id. (quoting district court).
57. Sullivan, slip op. at *4.
58. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7507.1 (2000) (amended 2005).
59. Sullivan, slip op. at *4.
60. See 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005).
61. See Abrams, supra note 6 at A2. The Sullivan problem seems to be repeating
itself, in 2005 a Maryland victim of downblousing was told by the police that there was
nothing they could do. Id. The Maryland legislature responded by amending its statute
effective October 2006 to cover the practice of upskirting. See H.R. 60, 421st Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006).
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Minnesota Court of Appeals's ruling affirming a right of privacy in
public places 62 offers little solace, as in that case the invasion of privacy
statute did not contain a definition of reasonable expectation of privacy.
63
Without a definition of the term, that court was free to adopt a broader
reading of the statute and rule that the victim had a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in the area immediately underneath her skirt.64
In contrast to the Minnesota statute, the "Place" statutes carefully
define when a person can have an expectation of privacy.65 Like the
Pennsylvania statute, the scope of the "Place" statutes is generally
limited to locations where the individual could disrobe without fear of
being observed.66 A "Place" state faced with an upskirting incident
would therefore likely be unable to apply the Morris decision. The Glas
and C'Debaca cases would apply.67  In both Glas and C'Debaca the
defendants were arrested after engaging in the same type of activity as
Sullivan.68  The Glas court held that the statute as written was not
applicable for the same reasons as stated in Sullivan-a person could not
have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in a public place. 69  The
C'Debaca court ruled likewise, limiting the scope of the Virginia statute
62. The court ignored the fact that the statute required that the person be in a "place"
where she had a "reasonable expectation of privacy." State v. Morris, 644 N.W.2d 114,
117 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); see also MINN. STAT. § 609.746 (Supp. 2006) ("A person is
guilty of a gross misdemeanor who surreptitiously gazes, stares, or peeps in the window
or other aperture of a ... place where a reasonable person would have an expectation of
privacy").
63. MINN. STAT. § 609.746 (Supp. 2006).
64. Morris, 644 N.W.2d at 117. Interestingly, the statute was plainly written to
apply to the traditional "peeping tom," much as the Pennsylvania statute was. Compare
MINN. STAT. § 609.746 (Supp. 2006), with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7507.1 (2000) (amended
2005). The statute refers to invasion of privacy as involving the "peeping" through a
window or other "aperture." MINN. STAT. § 609.746 (Supp. 2006). Yet the Court
brushed aside any inconsistencies, stating that every camera was an "aperture." 644
N.W.2d at 117.
65. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.08 (Supp. 2004) (limiting statute's effect to
"place[s] of solitude or seclusion" where a person would intend to undress and have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in doing so).
66. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-45-4-5 (Supp. 2006) ("restrooms, baths, showers, and
dressing rooms").
67. State v. Glas, 54 P.3d 147 (Wash. 2002); C'Debaca v. State, No. 2754-97-4,
1999 Va. App. LEXIS 72 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1999).
68. Glas was caught taking pictures up the skirts of two women at a Washington
mall. Glas, 54 P.3d at 149. C'Debaca was caught after filming underneath a woman's
dress at a county fair with a video camera he had concealed in a bag. C'Debaca, No.
2754-97-4 at *2.
69. Glas, 54 P.3d at 152. Washington's invasion of privacy statute was specifically
limited to places where a person could disrobe in privacy. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.44.115 (Place where individual can have an expectation of privacy limited to those
places "where a reasonable person would believe that he or she could disrobe in privacy,
without being concerned that his or her undressing was being photographed or filmed by
another").
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to private places.70
Faced with the possibility of loopholes making the practice of
upskirting legal, the states with "Place" statutes should amend their
existing laws now before a court case that tests the statute appears. By
revising the statutes now, the states can properly draft and debate the
measure, instead of simply acting fast to close a loophole. In amending
their statutes, state legislatures should look to the other states that have
dealt with this problem for guidance, and to Pennsylvania's statute to
avoid the mistakes the Pennsylvania General Assembly made.
IV. Pennsylvania Joins the New Order
In the wake of Sullivan the Pennsylvania Assembly acted quickly to
close the legal loophole exposed by the decision, and approved an
amendment to the current statutory language for the crime of invasion of
privacy. 7  The amendment makes it a crime when an individual
"photographs, videotapes, electronically depicts, films or otherwise
records, or personally views the intimate parts, whether or not covered
by clothing, of another person without that person's knowledge and
consent and which intimate parts that person does not intend to be visible
by normal public observation. 72  With this amendment Pennsylvania
joined the twenty-two other states that explicitly prohibit this practice.73
These statutes can be classified into two main groups: the "Public
Place" statutes 74 and the "Place-neutral" statutes. 75 The remaining three
statutes76 differ markedly from the others and consequently do not fit
within a classification system.
The first group, the "Public Place" statutes, addressed the problem
of upskirting by adding statutory language that specifically prohibits the
use of cameras and camera-like devices in public places under certain
70. C'Debaca, No. 2754-97-4 at *5 (holding that the statute's use of the phrase
"other location" was limited by the list of specific locations provided, which all shared
"the common element of being sites where a person could be partially or fully undressed
and would have an expectation of privacy-for example, when a person was trying on
clothes in a department store dressing room or changing clothes in the locker room at a
gym").
71. 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005).
72. Id.
73. See supra statutes cited at note 2.
74. Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Virginia, and Washington; see supra statutes cited at note
2.
75. Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont and Wyoming;
Pennsylvania would fall within this category as well. See supra statutes cited at note 2.
76. Kentucky, Minnesota, and Texas; see supra statutes cited at note 2.
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circumstances.7 7 Hawaii's statute is typical:
A person commits the offense of violation of privacy ... if ... the
person intentionally [and] covertly records or broadcasts an image of
another person's intimate area underneath clothing, by use of any
device, and that image is taken while that person is in a public place
and without that person 's consent.
7 8
Hawaii's statute and the others like it are simple attempts to cover a
specific type of behavior-the use of imaging devices in public places.
Most of the statutes refer to intimate areas or parts, and provide
definitions within the statute that explicitly include both nude and
undergarment-clad genital areas.79 Most of the statutes require only that
the act be done knowingly, without the intention of satisfying a person's
sexual interests.8 °
The second group, the "Place-neutral" statutes, generally apply
regardless of where the act occurs. 8' The Wyoming statute is typical:
A person is guilty of [Voyeurism] ... if he ... uses a camera, video
camera or any other image recording device for the purpose of
observing, viewing, photographing, filming or videotaping another
person under the clothing being worn by the other person where that
other person has not consented to the observing, viewing, photo-
82graphing, filming or videotaping.
The "Place-neutral" statutes closely resemble the "Public Place"
statutes in that they generally require both that the person act without the
knowledge or consent of the victim. 83  Most do not require a sexual
77. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1111 (Supp. 2005) (victim must be in a public
place); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (2004) (statute limited to public places in which
victim has taken "reasonable steps to conceal intimate areas").
78. HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1111 (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
79. Cf ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511 (2006) (going further to include "any
portion of the body" that has been concealed from public view); contra, IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-6609 (2004) (more restrictive, omitting any reference to "intimate areas"
concealed by undergarments). See also VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (Supp. 2006)
(limiting prohibited behavior to only the act of "placing the ... recording device in a
position directly beneath or between a person's legs for the purpose of capturing an
image of the person's intimate parts or undergarments").
80. See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (Supp. 2006) (no requirement that the
perpetrator act with a sexual intent); but see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (2004), WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.44.115 (Supp. 2006) (retaining the sexual intent requirement).
81. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2605 (Supp. 2006) (statute applies "regardless
of whether [the] person is in a public or private area").
82. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-304 (2005).
83. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2605 (Supp. 2006) ("No person shall
intentionally view, photograph, film, or record in any format the intimate areas of another
person without that person's knowledge and consent"), with IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609
(2004) (A person is guilty of video voyeurism when he uses, installs or permits the use or
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intent.84 These statutes mainly differ from the "Public Place" statutes in
that they could be used to embrace acts in any location.85
The remaining three statutes present not only classification
problems, but also application problems. The Kentucky statute, for
instance, handicaps law enforcement by requiring that before they may
act, the person not only must commit the act of upskirting, but also must
use the image in a financial transaction.86 This curious requirement
therefore prevents the police from acting until the person uses the image
87 88for economic gain. Pictures taken for private use would be exempt.
Absent an elaborate sting operation, the statute does nothing to prevent
an image from being released to the public at the expense of the victim.
The Texas statute, in contrast, suffers from poor drafting, and is
consequently susceptible to challenge on grounds of overbreadth and
vagueness. The law criminalizes the recording of another person under
any circumstances, whenever the person acts with a sexual intent 89 The
law contains absolutely no limitation on the act of filming; it covers the
entire person, not just one's intimate areas, whether clothed or not.90
Finally, the Minnesota law,91 although applied by the Morris court
to the practice of upskirting,92 does not resemble any of the other statutes
that cover the behavior and can fairly be characterized as a derelict
decision of an overreaching court.
installation of an imaging device at a place where a person would have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, without the knowledge or consent of the person using such
place"). But see HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1111 (Supp. 2005) (requiring only that
perpetrator act without consent of victim); VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (Supp. 2006)
(same).
84. But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:283 (2004) (lewd or lascivious purpose); see
also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-902 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (prurient intent).
85. Such a statute may also present problems of overbreadth. In State v. Stevenson,
613 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Wis. 2000), the court held that a statute that criminalized the "tak[ing
of] a photograph or [] a motion picture ... that [contains] nudity without the knowledge
or consent of the person who is depicted nude" was substantially overbroad. Id.
However, the statutes here almost universally are limited to images taken under or
through the clothing of a victim, rather than any picture containing nudity.
86. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 531.100 (West 2003) (individual must intentionally
"use[] or divulge[] any image so obtained for consideration").
87. Id.
88. Id. The statute does, however, provide an alternative to the "consideration"
requirement: an individual could be liable for distributing the image "by live or recorded
visual medium, electronic mail, the Internet, or a commercial on-line service." Id. But
keeping the image for one's own use would not be covered.
89. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.15 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
90. Id.
91. MINN. STAT. § 609.746 (Supp. 2006).
92. State v. Morris, 644 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
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V. The Pennsylvania Amendment: What's Wrong, What's Missing,
and What Might Have Been
The Pennsylvania amendment attempts to avoid some of the
difficulties seen in the other statutes but ultimately suffers from many
problems. First, the language of the statute, in contrast to most other
laws, applies to not only methods of image capture, but also the
unauthorized viewing of a person.93 This language expands the scope of
the statute greatly, as it would theoretically cover not only the upskirter,
but also the person who catches a quick peep of a person.9 4
Second, the amendment includes a requirement that the activity be
done for the purpose of sexual gratification.95 Such a requirement is
misguided; today's "Peeping Toms" are more likely to be engaged in the
96activity for economic gain, rather than for sexual gratification. As early
as 2001, one court stated that upskirting was a "thriving internet
business, with about a hundred web sites devoted to upskirt and other
candid body shots of unsuspecting female victims in public places.,
97
The court noted that the demand for the pictures had created a virtual
"cottage industry" of "professionals... and amateur contributors...
[who] stalk[ed] and secretly film[ed] victims [then] disseminat[ed] the
images on the internet.
' 98
Third, the Pennsylvania amendment provides for inadequate
punishment of offenders. A conviction under it would be classified as a
misdemeanor of the third degree, 99 with a sentence of no more than one
93. 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005) (criminalizing the
"personal viewing" of the intimate parts of a victim).
94. Id. The Pennsylvania law does not require that the individual look for any
period of time, in effect covering the shortest of glances. Id. One could theoretically be
found guilty for doing a "double-take" (the first look unintentional, the second one
intentional) down the blouse of a woman walking by in a low-cut top.
95. Id. Similar language was included in the California amendment, see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 647(k)(2) (West Supp. 2006), to the derision of some commentators. See, e.g.,
Kremenetsky, supra note 6 at 291 (stating that the limitation would exempt anyone acting
for commercial gain). The Pennsylvania amendment differs mainly from the California
statute in that it requires that the activity be for the gratification of "any person," rather
than the person taking the picture. Compare 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B.
761) (Nov. 16, 2005), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (West Supp. 2006).
96. See Antonietta Vitale, Video Voyeurism and the Right to Privacy: The Time for
Federal Legislation is Now, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 381, 409 (2003) (noting that
"today's Peeping Tom is an entrepreneur looking to satisfy a hungry market of voyeurs
waiting for someone else to do the dirty work"). The interest in, and demand for, upskirt
pornography has certainly not diminished since 2003: a recent search for "upskirting" on
Google yielded over 63,000 hits. Google Search of "Upskirting,"
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=upskirting (last visited January 5, 2007).
97. State v. Glas, 27 P.3d 216, 219 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), overruled by State v.
Glas, 54 P.3d 147, 152 (Wash. 2002).
98. Id.
99. 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005). Multiple
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year in prison,'00 and a fine up to $2,500.101 Although a provision
providing for enhanced punishment for multiple offenders is
admirable, 0 2 the overall punishment scheme is too lenient--especially
when compared with other states. 0 3 Pennsylvania's law is too forgiving.
Fourth, the amendment does not provide additional punishment for
the filming or recording of minors. 104 The inclusion of a provision for
greater punishment when the victim is a minor would act as a strong
deterrent to would-be offenders of the law. 0 5 A likely provision would
elevate the grading of the crime from a third-degree misdemeanor to a
first-degree misdemeanor. Such a provision would increase the
sentencing maximum to five years, 0 6 with a fine of up to $10,000.107 If
the person was a multiple offender, the grading would again increase,
this time to a third-degree felony.
0 8
A provision for increased penalties when the victim is a minor is
sensible because the conduct at issue is a form of child pornography.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that states have a
"compelling interest" in protecting minors. 0 9 Recognizing the need to
protect children from this activity, which is a form of child pornography,
the Assembly should have provided for the enhancement of sentencing in
the event the victim was a minor.
Fifth, the requirement that the victim must show intent to keep the
intimate areas private invites unscrupulous defenses based upon personal
attacks on the victim."0 One could imagine a situation in which the
offenses would be punishable as misdemeanors of the second degree. Id.
100. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1104(3) (2000). If the person was a multiple
offender, he could be sentenced to as much as two years in prison. Id.
101. Id. § 1101 (6). A multiple offender could be fined up to $5,000. Id.
102. See 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005)
103. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:283 (2004) (authorizing fines of up to
$10,000 and imprisonment from one to five years).
104. 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005).
105. Such "sentence boosters" when the victim is a minor have appeared in several
statutes. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-4 (Supp. 2006) (increasing charge from
misdemeanor to felony if victim is under the age of eighteen); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:283 (2004) (mandatory jail time of at least two years and a fine of up to ten thousand
dollars when the victim is under the age of seventeen); VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-386.1
(Supp. 2006) (increasing charge from a misdemeanor to a felony if victim is under the
age of eighteen).
106. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1104(1) (2000).
107. Id. § 1101(4).
108. A third-degree felony would be punishable by up to seven years in prison, with a
fine up to $15,000. See id. §§ 1101(3), 1103(3).
109. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982) (stating that governments
have a "special interest" in the well being of minor children, and that the use of children
as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the "physiological, emotional, and
mental health of the child").
110. 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005) ("[One who
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victim was wearing a short skirt, thong underwear, and was standing on a
second floor balcony by a staircase at the mall."' The fact that anyone
who looked up could see up the victim's skirt could be used as evidence
that she did not intend to keep the area private.
The mere inclusion of this language invites defense attorneys to
argue that the victim did not intend to keep the intimate areas private,
creating additional embarrassment for the victim, who would have
already suffered enough. One could even imagine a defense attorney
arguing that by wearing a short skirt, or a low cut top, a woman has
implicitly consented to the acts, absolving a defendant of any criminal
responsibility. Although such arguments may not prove very successful,
they make victims less likely to come forward against the people who
commit such crimes.
Finally, the amendment's inclusion of a section making it an offense
to transmit any images obtained in violation of the new law, while
admirable, fails to clearly define what a "transfer" is.112 A "transfer"
could be narrowly construed to mean only transactions for consideration
between parties. Alternatively, it could mean any transmission of an
image, regardless of whether the transmission is to another party, is for
consideration, or otherwise 1 3 Additionally, only transfers of an image
are prohibited; the individual receiving them is not committing a crime,
regardless of the meaning attached to the term.11 4 By using the term
"transfer" and not defining it within the statute, the Pennsylvania
legislature has hampered law enforcement efforts to prevent the further
abuse of upskirting victims after their perpetrators have been caught.
1 5
p]hotographs, videotapes, electronically depicts, films or otherwise records, or personally
views the intimate parts, whether or not covered by clothing, of another person without
that person's knowledge and consent and which intimate parts that person does not
intend to be visible by normal public observation") (emphasis added).
111. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sullivan, No. CP-21-CR-2382-2004, slip op. at *1
(Pa. Com. P1. Aug. 17, 2005) (victim wearing a short skirt and thong underwear).
112. 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005) (an individual
would be guilty of invasion of privacy if he "transfers or transmits an image obtained in
violation of [the Act] by live or recorded telephone message, electronic mail, the Internet
or by any other transfer of the medium on which the image is stored).
113. Take, for instance, the individual who gives away an image to friends, or who
posts it on the Internet. Under the first interpretation, he could not be charged for either
action under the section. Under the second interpretation, however, both the giving away
of the image and the posting of it on the Internet would be considered "transfers," and as
such he could be charged with violating the statute.
114. Id.
115. Id. As the definition is susceptible to more than one definition, an individual
charged with "transferring" an image could argue that the term was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. A court interpreting the term would apply the rule of lenity, see
Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994) ("an ambiguous criminal statute is to be
construed in favor of the accused"), and would likely limit the term's meaning.
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The Pennsylvania amendment, with all its flaws, shows the need for
the states to take greater care when revising their current laws to cover
this practice. Because thirty states still have not adequately addressed
this problem, it is very possible that when they do, drafting efforts could
lead to the same result as Pennsylvania's law. Therefore, the following
model statute, drawing upon the best section of the various state statutes
currently in effect, provides much-needed guidance to the many states
still struggling with this problem:
Invasion of Privacy
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits the offense of invasion of
privacy when he or she intentionally:
(a) Uses, causes to be used, or attempts to use any device now
known or later developed for the purpose of creating a visual
image in any form now known or later developed that depicts
another person's intimate areas without that person's knowledge
and consent, 116 or
(b) Distributes or makes available to another person through any
means a visual image known or believed to be obtained in
violation of subsection (1)(a), 117 or
(c) Receives a visual image that the person knows, or has reason
to believe, was obtained in violation of subsection (1)(a). 
1 1 8
(2) "Intimate Areas" Defined. For purposes of this section, "intimate
areas" means any portion of a person's body or undergarments that is
covered or partially covered by clothing and not normally visible by
the public. 11
(3) Multiple Offenses. A separate violation of this section shall be
deemed to have occurred:
(a) For each person's image obtained under subsection (1)(a),
when the images obtained are of more than one person, whether
during the same incident or separate incidents;
116. Subsection (1)(a) is drawn in part from the New Hampshire law. See N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 644:9 (Supp. 2006).
117. The "distribution" prohibition is seen in many states. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-6609 (2004).
118. This language is drawn from the North Carolina law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
202 (2005).
119. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115 (Supp. 2006).
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(b) For each separate incident under subsection (1)(a), when the
images obtained are of the same person.120
(4) Grading. Invasion of Privacy is a Misdemeanor punishable by up
to two years in prison and a fine up to $5,000. If the individual
accused has been previously convicted for Invasion of Privacy,
Invasion of Privacy is a Misdemeanor punishable by up to 5 years in
prison and a fine up to $10,000.121 If the victim of the offense is a
person under the age of eighteen, Invasion of Privacy is a Felony
punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a fine up to $15,000.122
(b) Exceptions. Subsection (1)(a) shall not apply to:
(a) Any law enforcement officer while engaged in a lawful
criminal investigation.
(b) Any law enforcement officer or Corrections officer, or any
person acting under their authority, while engaged in a lawful
Correctional investigation.
123
This model statute provides a clear definition of the offense,
unencumbered by needless requirements that the person act with any
specific intent. 124 It also has a strong sentencing scheme that recognizes
that when the crime is perpetrated on minors, additional punishment is
needed.125 Finally, it provides an exception for police officers and
correctional officers, so as not to encumber them while engaged in their
official duties. By adopting a statute that resembles the model one, states
would avoid the many problems found in the Pennsylvania amendment.
VI. Conclusion
An analysis of the current state of the law on the practice of
upskirting reveals a profound failure of the states to adequately address
this problem. Because twenty-seven states have failed to prohibit the
practice, their citizens are at the mercy of Peeping Toms who no longer
have to remain in the shadows of society because of new technologies
120. Subsection (3)(a) and (3)(b) are drawn from the Pennsylvania law, 2005 Pa.
Legis. Serv. Act 2005-69 (H.B. 761) (Nov. 16, 2005).
121. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:283 (2004).
122. See id.
123. Subsection (5)(a) and (5)(b) are also drawn from the Pennsylvania law, Pa. H.B.
761.
124. See supra notes 95-98 and the accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 98-108 and the accompanying text.
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that have made it much easier to get away with their activities.
Despite the efforts of some states, including Pennsylvania, the laws
addressing this practice reveal that significant work remains to be done.
The courts for the most part have been unable to apply the existing law to
this practice, 126 leaving it to the states to amend the existing law. Yet
many states have failed to protect the victims of this abhorrent
practice. 127
The twenty-six states that have not yet updated their laws should act
now to ensure their citizens are protected. In doing so, they should
examine carefully the new Pennsylvania law to avoid the mistakes into
which the General Assembly fell. Failure to act will only result in the
decision in Commonwealth v. Sullivan being repeated in other
jurisdictions.
126. See supra notes 50-60 and the accompanying text discussing the Sullivan,
C'Debaca, Glas, and Morris decisions.
127. See, e.g., supra notes 6 and 61.
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